Measuring the Impact of Globalization on the Well-being of the Poor: Methodology and an Application to Africa by Rahman, Tauhidur & Mittelhammer, Ronald C.
Please do not quote 




Measuring the Impact of Globalization on the Well-being of the Poor: Methodology 






Tauhidur Rahman  
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics 





Ron C. Mittelhammer 
School of Economic Sciences 









Selected Paper Prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics 
















  1Measuring the Impact of Globalization on the Well-being of the Poor: Methodology 




Abstract: Whereas a large number of empirical studies have been devoted to analyzing 
the relationship between measures of income and globalization (defined by openness to 
international trade), much less attention has been paid to the analysis of well-being for the various 
subgroups of population and their causal associations with globalization. To address this gap in 
the literature, this paper first analyzes the quality of life (QOL) of ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ 
population segments of 40 African countries over a period of 1980-2000, and then examines their 
causal association with openness to trade. In order to understand the impact of openness to trade 
on the well-being of poor, we assume the causal chain Openness→ Income→ Poverty→ Well-
being of poor and empirically examine link by link for Africa. The first link of the chain is from 
openness to growth. The second link in the causal chain from openness to well-being is the 
interrelationship between growth and poverty. The third link of the chain is from reduction in 
poverty to improvement of well-being. The major findings of this paper are: First, nearly every 
well-being indicator declines as the poor’s population share increases; second, the tendency for 
QOL to decline with increasing poor’s population share is common to the African and non-
African countries; third, women suffer a double QOL disadvantage in areas of health and 
education as the poor’s share of population increases; and fourth, globalization has improved 
incomes of African countries, however, there is a no significant decline in poverty and 
improvement in well-being of the poor over the period. We discuss the key challenges faces by 
African countries to beneficially engage in the world economy. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
A raging issue of academic and public debate concerns the impact of globalization 
on the well-being of the world’s poor. While some empirical evidence show that  
globalization promotes income (Noguer and Siscart, 2003; Frankel and Romer, 1999; and 
Irwin and Tervio, 2002), there is some empirical studies pointing to an increasing 
inequality in the world income distribution and divergence in the trend of incomes, as 
globalization has proceeded (McCulloch and McKay, 2004). In both cases, the more 
rigorous analyses of the impact of globalization in both developed and developing 
countries have tended to focus on macroeconomic indicators such as income and its 
distribution, neglecting social and quality of life (QOL) phenomena. But it is the 
improvement in the QOL that is the ultimate goal of international development. The 
  2precise nature of the various mechanisms through which the ongoing process of 
globalization has altered the pattern of income distribution and consequently the QOL 
facing the world’s poor is yet to be carefully analyzed. This is mainly because of two 
reasons. First, the globalization-QOL relationship is complex and heterogeneous, 
involving multifaceted channels. Second, available data sources are often fairly 
uninformative regarding how well-being differs amongst people and is influenced by 
globalization and public policy choices. The high level of aggregation in widely-used 
well-being indicators (e.g., life expectancy, infant mortality rate) is a common limitation 
of these indices; and it is often population subgroup decompositions of well-being 
indicators that are desired, but that this is unavailable from the conventional data sources 
(Bedani and Ravallion, 1997; Prescott and Jamison, 1985; and Waldman, 1992). For 
instance, it is desireable to analyze the differences in the causes and standards of living of 
‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ or ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ or other population segmentations. Are the 
world’s poor inherently less healthy? Does public spending and globalization matter 
more to them? How is the distribution of QOL across various segments of the population 
affected as globalization proceeds? These are questions that are of interest to economists 
as well as policy makers and must be addressed in order to fully assess the impact of 
globalization on the world’s poor. The highly aggregated nature of available data make it 
difficult for these questions to be addressed adequately using existing tools of analysis 
extant in the international economics literature. 
There are many reasons for the unavailability of subgroup decomposition of well-
being indicators: lack of survey integration (some surveys have recorded health data, 
  3some recorded income, but fewer recorded both), or simply the lack of access by users to 
the underlying micro data.  
While there is a large literature on the cross-country relationships between the 
measures of income and globalization, less attention has been given to the relationship 
between the distribution of well-being and globalization. In particular, very few studies 
have been devoted to the analysis of well-being for the various subgroups of population 
and their causal associations with globalization. 
The principal objectives of this paper are to: (a) analyze the QOL of the Poor in 
Africa, and (b) examine the impact of globalization on the well-being of the Poor in the 
Africa countries. In order to accomplish the stated objectives, we present a parsimonious 
statistical model that enables a QOL analysis of poor and non-poor population segments 
using national level data. Specifically, we analyze the QOL of ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ 
population segments of 45 African countries during the period of 1980-2000; and using 
the proposed statistical framework we empirically explore the impact of globalization on 
the well-being of poor in African countries. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
account of the debate on the globalization and its impact on the economic well-being. In 
Section 3, we summarize the existing evidence on the impact of globalization on the 
African countries, and highlight the fact that most of the studies have been limited to the 
macroeconomic indicators such as income and its distribution, neglecting social and 
quality of life (QOL) phenomena. Section 4 presents a parsimonious statistical model that 
enables a QOL analysis of poor and non-poor population segments. Section 5 includes 
the analysis of QOL of poor in African countries. Section 6 examines the impact of 
  4globalization on the well-being of poor. Finally, section 7 concludes by summarizing the 
major findings. 
 
2. The Debate on Globalization and Well-being 
  The impact of globalization is one of the most controversial development issues 
of the day. The skeptics of globalization attribute most of the ills of the world to 
globalization. The anti-globalization movement has focused attention to which decisions 
affecting the lives of millions of the world’s poorest people are made in international fora 
at which they have no voice. They see globalization as marginalizing a large part of the 
world’s population and contributing to increased international inequality
1. On the other 
hand, supporters of globalization see it as the key to eliminating world poverty. They 
point to the rapid economic growth of countries which have integrated with the global 
economy and the poverty reduction achieved in countries such as China, Vietnam, and 
India which have opened up their economies in recent years
2.  
  The theoretical case for globalization as a force for improving economic well-
being has two elements. First it is argued that globalization leads to faster economic 
growth and secondly that the poor share in the benefits of growth. The link between 
globalization and growth is attributed to openness to trade and foreign investment leading 
to a faster innovation in developing countries and thus to faster growth (Dollar, 2001). 
Endogenous growth theory is often appealed to as a causal explanation of the link 
between greater openness and growth, although it is also admitted that it is possible to 
develop endogenous growth models in which protection of the domestic market promotes 
                                                 
1 See for detailed discussion on Globalization and its Discontents; Stiglitz, Joseph (2002). 
2 For an excellent argument in favor of globalization; see Bhagwati, Jagdish (2004). 
  5growth (Dollar, 2001). Therefore, the effects of openness on growth is seen by the 
advocates of globalization as an empirical question. 
  The causal relationship between globalization, growth and well-being is, if 
anything, even less clearly specified. Implicitly faster growth leads to increased incomes 
for the poor through some form of trickle down which ensures that the benefits of growth 
are widely distributed. One plausible mechanism is through a Lewis type model where 
increased trade and investment pulls the surplus labor into gainful employment. 
However, it is possible to construct theoretical models in which the poor are by-passed by 
growth or even become increasingly marginalized (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002). This 
suggests that as with the link from trade to growth, that from growth to improvement of 
well-being is also primarily an empirical question. 
  Empirical studies on the impact of globalization on growth and well-being has so 
far been dominated by studies an aggregate level and limited to only macroeconomic 
indicators (incomes, or distribution of income), often involving cross-country 
comparisons of large number of countries.
3 This literature usually equates globalization 
with greater trade openness and focuses on income/consumption measures of growth and 
poverty. The pro-globalization case, as presented by the World Bank for example, argues 
that ‘globalizing’ countries have faster rates of GDP growth than ‘non-globalizing’ and 
that sincere there is no systematic relationship between growth or globalization  and 
income distribution, faster growth leads to increased income for the poor (World Bank, 
2002).  
                                                 
3 There is a vast literature dealing with the relationship between trade openness and growth of which the 
most notables have been Dollar (1992), Edwards (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), 
Frenkel and Romer (1999). More recently this type of analysis has been extended to look at the relationship 
between globalization and poverty (see Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Dollar, 2001). 
  6  Empirical studies that support globalization are open to criticism on several 
counts. First there is the question of defining globalization and identifying ‘globalizers’ 
as against ‘non-globalizers’ (Jenkins, 2004). In cross-country regressions, various 
indicators have been used, some of which are measures of outcomes such as the ratio of 
trade to GDP, while others are measures of trade policy e.g. tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). There are similar problems when the average performance 
of different groups of countries is compared and often the classification of countries 
becomes somewhat arbitrary (Rodrik, 2000).   
  Cross-country regressions assume that there is a universal impact of globalization 
which is independent of local conditions. However, as Ravallion (2001) argues, the 
impact of growth on inequality (and hence on poverty) depends on initial conditions such 
as the level of income and its distribution. Thus the emphasis on average relationships 
between globalization and poverty such as the claim by Dollar and Kraay that ‘the poor 
and the rich gain one-for-one from openness’ serves only to obscure such considerations 
and is seriously misleading. It has also been pointed that in the case of the relationship 
between openness and growth, the direction of causation is by no means clear cut. It may 
well be the case that faster growing economics become more open, rather than economies 
that become more open growing faster (Rodrik, 1999). Few empirical studies have 
tackled the problem of endogeneity of some of the independent variables used in cross-
country regressions (Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 1999).  
A further criticism is the one cannot infer what would happen over time from 
cross-section analysis of observations at a particular point in time. There is a peculiar 
blindness in the literature which focuses on cross-country comparisons. This assumes 
  7significance in the presence of evidence that the world economy and most countries 
performed far better during the 1960s and 1970s than over the last two decades 
(Milanovic, 2003). This is not true only in terms of economic growth but also of the rate 
of improvement of many of the social indicators which were much better in the earlier 
period (Weisbrot, et al., 2001).  
Faced with major concerns over the methodology used to study the impacts of 
globalization, even some mainstream economists such as Srinivasan and Bhagwati 
(1999), who are convinced with the benefits of globalization, have rejected cross-country 
regressions, arguing that what is required are more in depth case studies. Ravallion 
(2001) has pointed to the importance of more micro, and country-specific, researches on 
the factors determining why some poor people are able to take up the opportunities 
afforded by an expanding economy-and so add to its expansion-while others are not. 
This paper extends the analysis of the impact of globalization beyond 
macroeconomic indicators of development and examines the relationship between 
globalization and non-economic indicators of well-being.  
 
3. Empirical Studies on the Impact of Globalization on African Countries 
  There are few studies that have focused on examining the impact of globalization 
on African countries. Sachs and Warner (1999) while explaining the sources of slow 
growth in African economies find that basic economic policies such as openness to 
international trade, government saving and market-supporting institutions have had larger 
quantitative impact on economic growth. They show that African economies have paid an 
enormous price as a result of highly distorted trade policies since independence. A small 
  8number of African economies adopted open trade: Botswana and Mauritius by the early 
1970s, Morocco and Tunisia in the mid-1980s. These economies have out-performed the 
rest of Africa by a wide margin.  Their study suggests that even with its natural 
disadvantages, Africa could have grown at over 4 percent per year in per capita terms 
with appropriate policies. They argue that African countries that have engaged in serious 
pro-growth economic reforms (which often mean policies towards globalization) have 
achieved impressive growth rates. They conclude that there is little compelling empirical 
evidence in favor of growth pessimism for Sub-Saharan Africa.  
  Baliamoune (2002) explores the effects of openness to international trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth in Africa. She finds that FDI has a 
significant positive impact on economic growth in Africa. However, openness to trade 
does not seem to enhance in poor countries. Her findings fail to substantiate the 
proposition that greater openness facilitates convergence to higher income incomes. On 
the contrary, she finds evidence that shows that greater openness to international trade 
promotes economic growth primarily in higher-income African countries, implying that 
threshold effects may be crucial to the effectiveness of openness.  
  Manda and Sen (2004), using both industry-level and firm-level data, examine the 
effects of globalization on employment and earning in the Kenyan manufacturing sector. 
Their industry level analysis suggests that the overall effect of globalization on 
manufacturing sector employment has been negative in the 1990s. The firm-level analysis 
suggests that less skilled workers experienced losses in earnings, and that the inequality 
in earnings between skilled and unskilled workers increased during this period. This 
  9suggests that globalization has been associated with adverse labor market outcomes in 
Kenya. 
  The paper by Edwards (2004) uses two firm level surveys, the National Enterprise 
(NE) and the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area (GJMA) survey, to explore the 
implications of globalization for employment in South Africa. He explores these 
relationships using cross-tabulations and estimating labor demand functions. He finds 
that rising import penetration negatively affected employment in large firms, but not 
small firms. He documents relatively large decline in employment with export firms, 
despite improvements in export competitiveness and export growth through trade 
liberalization. Finally, he finds that skill-biased and trade-induced technological changes, 
as reflected in increased use of computers, foreign investment and the importation of raw 
material inputs, have raised the skill intensity of production. 
  Thus, there is mixed evidence on impact of globalization on African countries. 
However, we note even these preceding studies have tended to focus on explaining the 
“average” effects of globalization on economic growth and employment, and hence they 
are also limited to macroeconomic indicators of development. In the next section, we 
provide a straightforward statistical framework that allows us to study the QOL of the 
Poor in African countries and their association with globalization. 
 
4. The Model for Analyzing the QOL of Poor and Non-poor Population 
Using national level data to analyze the QOL of ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ population 
segments is possible on the basis of two key information components: first, an analysis of 
national well-being indicators in a cross-country framework, together with the data on the 
  10share of the population that is poor is required; second, imposition of additional structure 
on the data must be imposed (discussed ahead). The starting point for the method is the 
conceptualization of a national indicator in terms of a weighted average of corresponding 
‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ indicators, with poor and non-poor population shares serving as the 
appropriate weights. Additional structure on the data is the assumption that the 
underlying (unobserved or latent) poor and non-poor QOL indicators are each comprised 
of two components: one that is common for all countries in the sample for poor people, 
and another  for non-poor people, and one that is purely country-specific for poor and 
non-poor people, respectively. We do not assume that the QOL of the poor, and for the 
non-poor population segments is the same in every country under study, but only that 
there is some portion of the poor’s QOL and some portion of the non-poor’s QOL that is 
shared in every country and which can be estimated.   
Specifically, assume that  is the value of the well-being indicator at the 
national level in country i for timet;   and  are the values of indicators for poor 
and non-poor population segments in country i for timet respectively; and   is the 
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The intercept of regression equation (6) is an estimate of the indicator for the non-poor 
segment of the population, while the slope represents the difference between the poor and 
non-poor values of the indicator. The error term, , captures the variation across 
countries. 
it v
This model framework suggests using cross-country data to fit a simple linear 





  12and population share of poor (s ). Given the model structure (2)-(6), the fitted intercept 
will be an estimate of the common component to each country’s non-poor-specific 
indicator. The fitted slope will be an estimate of the difference between the common 
components of each country’s non-poor- and poor-specific indicators. At the least, we 
could interpret the specific regression equation (6) as describing QOL differences 
between countries that differ in poor’s population shares.  
P
it
In order to examine the impact of globalization on the well-being of poor, we 
estimate a version of equation (6) where independent variables besides population share 
of poor, include a measure of globalization, corruption, temporal trend, terms for the 
interactions between poor’s population share and globalization, between poor’s 
population share and time trend, and among many others. Specifying the model with a 
temporal trend, terms for the interactions between poor’s population share and the time 
trend (or the year dummy), between globalization and poor’s population share, and 
between globalization, poor’s populations hare, and time trend allows an examination of 
changes in the intercept and slope over time. We interpret these changes as estimates of 
overall increases or decreases in the particular well-being indicator and as changes over 
time in the inequality between poor and non-poor QOL and their association with 
globalization. The method provides a straightforward tool for analyzing trends in QOL in 
African countries and their causal relationship with globalization. 
 
5. Analysis of the QOL of the‘Poor’ in Africa 
“It is in the deprivation of the lives that people can lead that poverty 
manifests itself. Poverty can involve not only the lack of the necessities of 
material well-being, but the denial of opportunities for living a tolerable 
life. Life can be prematurely shortened. It can be made difficult, painful or 
  13hazardous. It can be deprived of knowledge and communication. And it can 
be robbed of dignity, confidence and self-respect–as well as the respect of 
others. All are aspects of poverty that limit and blight the lives of many 
millions in the world today.”   
                                              (Human Development Report, 1997) 
 
 It is clear that poverty is highly associated with deprivation in various aspects of QOL. 
Thus, dealing with the poverty is the main instrument that can effectively eliminate 
deprivation and inequalities in human well-being.   
Poverty has degraded human lives for centuries. Human deprivation is still 
persistent in the developing countries of the world. Today, nearly a third of the people 
(1.3 billion) live on less than $ 1 a day (1985 PPP $).  Approximately 800 million people 
do not get enough to eat and more than half billion are chronically malnourished. More 
than 840 million adults are still illiterate. About 800 million people lack access to health 
services, and more than 1.2 billion lack access to safe drinking water. Moreover, children 
and women suffer the most. Nearly 160 million children under age five are malnourished, 
and more than 110 million children are out of school. The maternal mortality rate is 
nearly 500 women per 100,000 live births.  However, deprivation is not limited to only 
developing countries of the world. The developed countries also suffer. Today, more than 
100 million of their people still live below the income poverty line- at 50% of the 
individual median adjusted disposable income. More than a third of adults do not 
complete upper-secondary education. 
At the same time, uneven progress  has given rise to disparities among regions, 
not only across countries, but also within countries- between women and men and rural 
and urban, between ethnic groups, and between poor and non-poor. For instance, in 1994 
  14the ratio of the income of the richest 20% of the world to that of the poorest 20% was 78 
to 1, up from 30 to 1 in 1960. Finally, the face of poverty is changing. Even though most 
poor still live in Africa and Asia, the profile of poverty is rapidly shifting. In the next 
century a poor person is less likely to be a smallholder in Asia, and more likely to be an 
unskilled, low-wage worker in urban Africa and Latin America.  
 
5.1 Nature of the Data 
  Quantitative indicators were selected using country-level data. No single database 
contained all the relevant data, but aggregate data were available for most of the African 
countries.  The data was also available for different points of time as far as the 1960 
although not for every variable one might ideally wish to study. Most of the data 
examined have been assembled from African Development Bank Reports, the Human 
Development Report office of UNDP, and the World Bank for the period 1980-2000. 
  Among the main weaknesses of the aggregate data is that none of the QOL 
indicators analyzed are measured separately for the poor and non-poor segments of the 
population.  In section 4, a direct econometric technique was developed that allows 
inferences to be drawn about the QOL of the poor segments of the population from 
national-level data. Despite the formidable proportion of poor in the population across 
countries, there is a paucity of data available for measuring directly the level and trend of 
QOL of the poor across countries.  
5.2 QOL Indicators 
  QOL is a multidimensional concept with many influences that vary in importance 
over time and across different countries. In present analysis, QOL is viewed broadly as 
  15having multiple domains, each of which has at least several indicators. These domains 
are: nutrition, health, education, income, gender equality, fertility, political and civil 
freedom, environmental quality, access to information, and access to infrastructure.  
Several indices of the general state of social and human development are also examined.   
In order to analyze the QOL of ‘poor’ and ‘nonpoor’ population segments of 
African countries, we have used 45 well-being indicators which are grouped into 11 QOL 
components. Table 1 lists QOL indicators, and their measurements.  
 
5.3 Comparisons of QOL 
  Both historical and comparative yardsticks were adopted for assessing the QOL of 
poor segments of the population of the world. Specifically, several QOL indicators were 
selected and three types of comparisons were made: 
•  between poor Africa and non-poor Africa; 
•  between poor Africa and poor populations in other regions; 
•  between poor segments of the population at different points in time. 
A main feature of the available data is that many variables were measured at only 
one, usually quite recent, point in time. For these QOL indicators only between-country 
analyses were possible. By contrast, for those indicators that were measured at two or 
more points in time, QOL patterns at each point in time as well as temporal trends (a 
within-country analysis) could be examined.  
5.4 Defining ‘Poor’ 
  A fundamental difficulty in examining the QOL of the poor relates to the absence 
of a commonly accepted definition or measure of the term ‘poor’.  It is a statistical 
  16concept defined by every country’s national government, commonly based on its poverty 
line deemed appropriate by its authorities. Developing countries that have set national 
poverty lines have generally used the food poverty method. These lines indicate the 
insufficiency of economic resources to meet basic minimum needs in food. There are 
three approaches to measuring food poverty: cost-of-basic-needs method, food energy 
method, and food share method. All three approaches are sensitive to the price level used 
to determine the cost of the bundle. And all three concentrate mainly on calories or 
dietary energy, because protein deficiency due to inadequate economic resources is 
perceived to be rare in most societies. In industrial societies national poverty lines are 
also used to measure relative poverty. However, we emphasize that the measure of ‘poor’ 
based on national poverty lines are not comparable across countries because each country 
sets its own poverty line based on what they consider appropriate.  
  As a result of the difficulty in defining the concept of “poor”, we use poverty lines 
for international comparison. To overcome the problem of non-comparability of 
measures of poor based on national poverty lines, the World Bank measures poverty 
based on an international poverty line and the commonly used standard is $ 1 a day, 
measured in 1985 international prices and adjusted to local currency using purchasing 
power parities (PPPs), which is typical of poverty lines in low-income countries.           
          Table 1 reports estimates of the headcount indices for $ 1 per day at 1993 PPP. 
From the Table 2 we notice that the aggregate poverty rate has fallen slightly over the 
period, from 28.3% of the 1987 population living in households with consumption per 
capita below $1 per day to 23.4% in 1998. Throughout the period, the region with the 
highest poverty relative to the $1 per day line is Sub-Saharan Africa, followed closely by 
  17South Asia. Eastern Europe and Central Asia began the period as the region with the 
lowest poverty incidence, but by the end of the period it had overtaken Middle-East and 
North Africa. In other words, the incidence of poverty fell in Asia and the Middle East-
North Africa. It changed little in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, and it rose 
sharply in Eastern Europe-Central Asia.  The main causes of the disappointing rate of 
poverty reduction are too little economic growth in many of the poorest countries and 
persistent inequalities that inhibited the poor from participating in the growth that did 
occur (Chen and Ravallion, 2000).  
Table 2: Population living on less than $ 1 per day and Head Count Index in 




covered Head Count Index (Percent)
  by at least one survey     
 
 




East Asia and the Pacific  90.8  26.6  27.6  14.7  15.3 
(excluding China)  71.1  23.9  18.5  9.4  11.3 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  81.7  0.2  1.6  3.7  5.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 88  15.3 16.8 12.1  15.6 
Middle East and North Africa  52.5  4.3  2.4  2.1  1.9 
South Asia  97.9  44.9  44  40  40 
Sub-Saharan Africa  72.9  46.6  47.7  48.1  46.3 
          
Total 88.1  28.3  29  23.4  24 
(excluding China)  84.2  28.5  28.1  25.6  26.2 
 
Note: The $1 a day is in 1993 purchasing power parity terms. The numbers are estimated from those 
countries in each region for which at least one survey was available during the period 1985–98. The 
proportion of the population covered by such surveys is given in column 1. Survey dates often do not 
coincide with the dates in the above table. To line up with the above dates, the survey estimates were 
adjusted using the closest available survey for each country and applying the consumption growth rate 
from national accounts. Using the assumption that the sample of countries covered by surveys is 
representative of the region as a whole, the numbers of poor are then estimated by region. This 
assumption is obviously less robust in the regions with the lowest survey coverage. The head count index 
is the percentage of the population below the poverty line. Further details on data and methodology can 
be found in Chen and Ravallion (2000) How Have the World's Poorest Fared in the 1990s? 
5.5 Quantitative Analysis of QOL of Poor 
  Figure 1, which plots country values of the HDI against the poor population share 
for 1997. As noted earlier, the HDI was used because it is reasonably broad and well-
  18established development indicator. Regression estimates reported and discussed later will 
be used to assess the statistical significance of the patterns and trends portrayed 
graphically here.  
The regression lines between the HDI and poor share of the population slope 
downward, which indicate that the HDI is lower in more heavily poor countries and 
within countries the HDI tends to be lower among poor populations than among non-poor 
populations.








R-Sq = 61.0 %
HDI = 0.901450 - 2.73E-03Poor Share
Figure 1. Human Development Index versus Poor Population Share Based on 
International Poverty Line  
 
  19Figure 2 shows that the life expectancy of populations of various regions has improved 
from 1970 through 1998.  The plot also reveals that the improvements were not uniform 
across regions. For instance, the highest improvement has been made by the Middle East 
and the North African countries (an improvement of 15 years)over the period 1970-
1998),  followed closely by South Asia. The significant gain in longevity by Middle East-
North African countries is an indication that these countries have been able to translate 
rapid growth in their GDP, owing to oil revenues, into better health outcomes and 
significant reductions in the incidence of poverty.  On the other hand, significant gain in 
life expectancy by South Asian countries can be explained partly by some reduction in 
the incidence of poverty, and partly because they began at a relatively low level of life 
expectancy of 49 years in 1970.  The least improvement has been made by Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (an improvement of 1 year throughout the period). This 
observation is not at all surprising given the fact that Eastern Europe and Central Asian 
countries experienced significant increases in the incidence of poverty over the period 
1987-1998 (Table 2). The Sub-Saharan countries achieved a gain of 6 years in their life 
expectancy, from 44 years in 1970 to 50 years in 1998. However, it is a disappointing 
performance given the fact they began with very low level of longevity and the length of 
the period was quite long.  








































               Figure 2: Trends in Life Expectancy 
 
In any case, the small gain might be expected given that over a period of two 































































               Figure 3: Trends in Infant Mortality Rate, 1970-1998 
 
  21Figure 3 displays the trends in infant mortality rates across various regions.  While all 
regions succeeded in reducing the incidence of infant mortality rates, once again the 
disappointing performance of Sub-Saharan Africa is notable.  Sub-Saharan Africa had 
infant mortality rate of 137 per 1,000 live births in 1970, which was reduced to a still 
high 92 per 1,000 live births by 1998. Given the length of the period under consideration, 
the reduction is arguably disappointing. However, Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor 
performance in reducing the incidence of infant mortality rate is consistent with its 
performance in alleviating the incidence of poverty. As noted earlier, Sub-Saharan Africa 
made almost no progress in terms of reducing the incidence of poverty over the period of 
two decades spanning 1987-1998. 
  





















































               Figure 4: Trends in under-5 mortality rates 
 
 Figure 4 presents the trends in mortality rates for under-5 years' age. With the exception 
of Sub-Saharan, all other regions succeeded in reducing under-5 mortality rates by a 
  22substantial rate.  The total reduction in under-5 mortality rate achieved by Sub-Saharan 
African was a mere 3% during the period of 1990-1998.  
As seen from a policy perspective, two inferences are evident from the preceding 
graphical results: QOL is lower in more heavily poor countries and that within countries 
the QOL tends to be lower among poor populations than among non-poor populations. 
Every QOL indicator we considered in the graphical analyses is highly associated with 
the incidence of poverty. Dealing with poverty is the main instrument that can effectively 
eliminate deprivation in human well-being. 
 
5.6 Cross-country Regression Results  
Here we present a preliminary analysis of QOL of Poor in African countries in the 
year 1997. We the run the following regression: 
(* ) NP P yS D S D it t t it t i it i it αβ δ λ =+ + + + v   
Where,    N yit a national well-being indicator,  is population share of the poor,  P Sit Di  is 
dummy variable for African countries, and    is the interaction between the 
population share of the poor and dummy variable for the African countries, and   is 
error term that captures the variation across countries, respectively for country i  and year 
1997.                     
* P SD it i
vit
Tables 3 contain estimates of the parameters of least squares regressions fit to 
cross-country data on a wide range of QOL indicators for the year 1997 (or most recent 
years available). Forty-five indicators were grouped into 10 QOL components listed 
above plus several summary development indexes. 
  23  Following the earlier discussion, regressions for each QOL indicator on poor 
population share were fitted to data for as many countries as possible. The specification 
included an indicator variable for African countries and an interaction term between the 
African indicator variable and poor population share. Including these variables allowed 
us to test whether the intercept and slope of the underlying regression of QOL on poor 
population share differed between the African and non-African countries, that is, we were 
able to compare average non-poor and poor QOL between African and non-African 
countries.  
  The results in Table 3 provide a useful descriptive summary of the QOL of poor 
population in African countries and suggest three major findings: 
  First, nearly every QOL indicator declines as poor population share increases. 
The finding that poor’s QOL is worse than non-poor’s QOL applies to indicators ranging 
from human development indexes, literacy gap (Male-Female), and population without 
access to public health services. 
  Second, evidence of a significant difference in the QOL-poor population share 
relationship between African and non-African countries are present for only few QOL 
indicators. For nearly all indicators, the tendency for QOL to decline with increasing poor 
population share is common to the African and non-African samples. None of the 
exceptions to this finding is particularly notable. 
  Third, poor women suffer a double QOL disadvantage in the areas of health and 
education. The first disadvantage is due to their poor subgroup, which is associated with 
lower rates of literacy, secondary school enrollment, health, nutrition, and longevity. The 
second disadvantage is due to existence of relatively wider gender gaps in indicators of 
  24the QOL among poor segments of population in Africa and elsewhere. For example, 
Table 3 indicates that the male-female gap in education widens significantly as poor 
population share increases. Women’s normal advantage in life expectancy is substantially 
lower among poor than non-poor populations. The QOL disadvantage of poor women is 
presumably magnified further by the effects of poor health and education on other QOL 
indicators not measured here, such as security and access to credit. 
 
6. Impact of Globalization on the Well-being of Poor in Africa 
In order to analyze and understand the impact of openness to trade on the well-
being of poor in Africa, we assume the causal chain 
 of Poor and empirically examine link by 
link for Africa. The first link of the chain is from openness to growth. The main 
manifestation of openness is through trade and capital movement liberalization which in 
turn is presumed to affect growth directly through three sub-channels: exports, imports 
and capital flows. Trade liberalization policies encourage exports which benefit export 
industries and contribute to GDP growth (Nissanke and Thorbecke 2005). The second 
link in the causal chain from openness to well-being is the interrelationship between 
growth and poverty. The third link of the chain is from reduction in poverty to 
improvement of well-being.  
Openness Income Poverty Well being ⇒⇒ ⇒ −
 
6.1 Openness to trade and Income  
  There is growing consensus in empirical studies that greater openness to 
international trade (globalization) has a positive effect on country per capita income. 
  25Figure 5 shows the relationship between per capita income and openness to trade.  It 
clearly shows that there is a positive relationship between per capita income and 
openness to trade in African countries. That is open economies in Africa have a higher 
level of per capita income than countries that are not open. 
 



























































Figure 6 shows the relationship between GDP per capita growth and openness to 
trade. Thus trade influences growth in Africa and this result is consistent with earlier 
findings (Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995; and Dollar and Kraay, 2001 a &b). 
However, it is worth nothing here, that the positive openness-growth link is neither 
automatically guaranteed nor universally observable, as we observe from figure 6 that 
with similar degrees of openness, different countries have varying levels of GDP growth.  































































Figure 7 shows the link between trade volatility and volatility of GDP per capita. 
Trade volatility is defined as the standard deviation of openness to trade over 30-year 
period (1970 to 2000) as in Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Ramsey and Ramsey 
(1995). The use of a long-run measure for trade volatility is consistent with our idea that 
it is risk rather than shocks that matter. Similarly, volatility of GDP per capita income is 













































































Volatility of Per Capita GDP and Openness to Trade
 
 
To summarize, there is a clear evidence for the positive impact of openness to 
trade on income among African countries. 
 
6.2 Income and Poverty 
  Next we examine the second link in the causal chain from openness to well-being 
of poor. Figure 8 shows the link between the level of per capita GDP and poverty among 
African countries. It shows that the relationship between the level of GDP per capita and 
poverty is negative, though not very strong, suggesting that if higher GDP growth is 
accompanied with an increase in income inequality, it may not result in decline in 
poverty.   
  
  28Figure 8. Income and Poverty 
























































Poverty and GDP Per Capita
 
  
Figure 9. Poverty and Volatility of Growth 




















































Poverty and Volatility of Per Capita GDP Growth
 
  29Figure 10. Volatility of Poverty and Volatility of Growth 





































































Volatilities of Poverty and Per Capita GDP Growth
 
 
6.3 Globalization and Poverty 

























































Poverty and Openness to Trade
 
Figure 12. Trade Volatility and Poverty 







































































Volatilities of Poverty and Trade Openness
 
  316.4 Poverty and Well-being of Poor 
  The final link in the causal chain from openness to well-being of poor is the 
interrelationship between poverty and well-being indicators. Figure 13 shows the 
relationship between infant mortality rate and poverty. From this figure it is apparent that 
high mortality rate is positively and strongly associated with high level of poverty.  
  


































































































































































Figure 14 shows the relationship between life expectancy at birth and poverty. It 
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The following figures show the relationship between educational attainment and poverty. 
There is a negative relationship between educational attainment and poverty. That is 
African countries with high incidence of poverty have lower educational achievement. 
Alternatively, higher is the educational attainment in a country the lower is the incidence 
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Secondary Gross Enrollment versus Poverty
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7. Preliminary Concluding Remarks 
  In this paper we made two principal contributions: first, we proposed a method for 
representing well-being aggregates and estimating population subgroup decompositions 
when data is available on population distributions across subgroups; second, we analyzed 
the QOL of ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ population segments of 45 countries for during 1980-
2000. The three major findings of this paper are as follows: First, nearly every well-being 
indicator declines as the poor’s population share increases; second, evidence of a 
significant difference in the QOL-poor’s population share relationship between African 
  35and non-African, countries is present for only few QOL indicators. In other words, the 
tendency for QOL to decline with increasing poor’s population share is common to the 
African and non-African countries; third, women suffer a double QOL disadvantage in 
areas of health and education as the poor’s share of population increases. This is due to 
the existence of relatively wider gender gaps in the well-being indicators among poor 




































  36Table 1: Well-Being components and Indicators 
 
Variable Definition 
Development Indexes   
Human Development Index  Human Development Index value-a composite index combining measures of  
  measures of life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrollment and PPP GDP 
  per capita. 
Gender-related  Gender-related development index (GDI) value-the HDI but with its  
Development Index  components adjusted for inequalities between men and women. 
   
Gender empowerment  Gender empowerment measure (GEM) value- a composite index combining 
Index  measures in gender inequality in parliamentary seats, legislative senior 
  official and managerial positions, professional and technical employment 
  and earned income. 
Gender   
Female Share of Earning   Percentage of total national earnings earned by women (%) 
Labour Force Gap(Male-
Female)  Percentage of male labour force minus percentage of female labour force. 
Literacy Gap    Male literacy rate minus female literacy rate (%). 
Enrollment Gap   Male gross enrollment ratio minus female gross enrollment ratio (%). 
Life Expectancy Gap   Male life expectancy minus female life expectancy.  
Real GDP Per Capita Gap  Real GDP per capita income of Male minus real GDP per capita income of 
  Female, (PPP $). 
Female Economic Activity 
Rate  Female economic activity rate as percentage of male rate (%).  
Female Primary Net 
enrollment  Female primary net enrollment ratio as percentage of male primary enrolllment 
Ratio  ratio (%). Net primary enrollment enrollment ratio is defined as the number of 
  students enrolled in a level of education who are of offcial school age for that 
  level, as percentage of the population of official school age for that level. 
Female Secondary Net   Female net secondary enrollment ratio as percentage of male secondary net 
Enrollment Ratio  enrollment ratio (%). Net secondary enrollment ratio is defined as the number 
  of students enrolled in a level of education who are of official school age for 
  that level, as percentage of the population of official school age for that level. 
Female Tertiary Student  Female Tertiary student as as percentage of male tertiary student (%).  
  Tertiary education is defined as the education at the third level (levels 5, 6, 7) 
  such as universitities, teachers colleges and higher professional schools.  
Income   
GDP per capita in PPP$  Gross domestic prodcut is total value of the goods and services produced 
  by an economy. It is adjusted here for purchasing power parity (PPP), i.e.  
  the number of units of that currency required to purchase the same  
  representative basket of goods and services that US $1 would buy in  the  
  United States. 
Population below Poverty line  Percentage of population living at or below US $1 a day of consumption 
US $1/day  or income at 1985 prices, adjusted for PPP. 
Population below Poverty line  Percentage of population living at or below US $14.40 a day of consumption 
US $14.40/day  or income at 1985 prices, adjusted for PPP. 
Education   
Adult Literacy Rate  The percentage of people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding 
  , both read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life (%). 
Combined first, second and   Combined first, second and third level gross enrollment ratio (% gross). 
  37third level gross enrollment   
ratio   
Children not Reaching   The percentage of children starting primary school who eventually do attain 
Grade 5  grade 5 (%). 
Public Education Expenditure  Public education expenditure as percentage of GDP (%). Public expenditure 
  on public education plus subsidies to private education at the primary, 
  secondary and tertiary levels. 
Health   
Life Expectancy at Birth  The number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of  
  mortality at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child's life. 
Infant Mortality Rate  The annual number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live 
  births. More specifically, the probability of dying between birth and one year  
  of age multiplied by 1,000. 
   
Maternal Mortality Rate  The annual number of deaths of women from pregnancy-related causes per 
  100,000 live births. 
Under Age 5 Mortality Rate  The annual number of deaths of children under age 5 per 1,000 live births. 
  More specifically, the probability of dying between birth and exactly five years 
  of age expressed per 1,000 live births. 
Infants with low birth weights  Infants with low birth weights (%)-the percentage of infants with a birth weight 
  of less than 2,500 grams. 
Adults with HIV/AIDS  Number of people living with HIV/AIDS per 100,000 population. 
Tuberculosis cases  Number of Tuberculosis cases per 100,000 population. 
Population without Access to   Percentage people without access to health services (%). 
Health Services   
Nutrition   
Daily Per Capita Supplies of   The calorie equivalent of the next food supply (local production plus imports 
Calories  minus exports) in a country, divided by the population, per day. 
Underweight Children   Underweight children under age five (%)- includes moderate and severe  
Under age 5  underweight, which is defined as below two standard deviations from the  
  weight for age of the reference population. 
Fertility and Demography   
Total Fertility Rate  The average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during 
  her lifetime if she were to bear children at each age in accord with prevailing  
  age-specific fertility rates. 
Contraceptive Prevalance 
Rate  Contraceptive prevalence rate (%)- the percentage of married women aged  
  15-49 who are using, or whose partners are using, any form of contraception, 
  whether modern or traditional. 
Births to Mothers under age 
20  Birth to mothers under age age (%). 
Population Growth Rate  Growth rate of population (%) 
Environment   
Annual Deforestation  Annual permanent clearing of forestlands for shifting cultivation, permanent 
  agriculture or settlements; it does not include alterations such as selective 
  logging (%). 
Carbon Dioxide Emmissions  Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (metric ton). 
Population without Access   Population not using improved drinking water sources (%). 
to Safe Water   
Population without Access to   Population not using adequate sanitation facilities (%). 
Sanitation   
  38Variables   Definitions 
Access to Information   
TV sets   TV sets per 1,000 people. 
   
Crimes    
Drugs Crime  Number of Drugs crime per 100,000 people. 








































  39TABLE 3. Quality of Life of Poor. Comparisons with Non-poor and Poor Non-Asian++ 













1.Human Development Index 
 
 
2.Gender-related Development Index 
 
 




4. Literacy Gap (Male-Female) 
 
 
5. Enrollment Gap (Male-Female) 
 
 
6. Life Expectancy Gap (Male-Female) 
 
 
7. Log GDP Per capita Gap (Male-Female) 
 
 
8. Female Economic Activity Rate (% of Male rate) 
 
 
9. Female Primary Net Enrollment (% of Male Rate) 
 
 
10. Female Secondary Net Enrollment (% of Male Rate) 
 
 










13. Adult Literacy (%) 
 
 
14. Combined first, second and third level gross enrollment 
(% gross) 
 
15. Children not Reaching Grade 5 (%) 
 
 





17. Life Expectancy at Birth 
 
 




































































































































































































































































































































































































  4019. Maternal Mortality 1990 (per 100,000 live birth) 
 
 
20. Under Age Five Mortality Rate  
 
 
21. Infants with Low Birth Weights (%) 
 
 
22. AIDS Cases (per 100,000) 
 
 
23. Tuberculosis Cases (per 100,000) 
 
 





25. Daily Per capita Supplies of Calories 
 
 





27. Total Fertility Rate 
 
28.Contraceptive Prevalence Rate 
 
 
29. Births to Mothers Under Age 20 (%) 
 
 





31. Annual Deforestation (%) 
 
 
32. Carbon Dioxide Emissions per capita (metric ton) 
 
 
33. Population without Access to Safe Water (%) 
 
 
34. Population without Access to Sanitation (%) 
 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
35. TV Sets ( per 1,000 people) 
 
 
CRIMES AND OTHERS 
 
36. Drugs Crime (per 100, 000 people) 
 
 
37. Intentional Homicides ( per 100,000 people)  
 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: See Appendix 1. ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level, ++ Poor share is 
defined as population below income poverty line (%) $1.00 a day, 1989-94. 
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